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THE ELECTRIC DEREGULATION FIASCO: 
LOOKING TO REGULATORY FEDERALISM 
TO PROMOTE A BALANCE BETWEEN 
MARKETS AND THE PROVISION OF 
PUBLIC GOODS 
Jim Rossi* 
MONOPOLIES IN AMERICA: EMPIRE BUILDERS AND THEIR ENEMIES 
FROM JAY GOULD TO BILL GATES. By Charles R. Geisst. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 2000. Pp. x, 355. $30. 
POWER Loss: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM. By 
Richard F. Hirsh. Cambridge: MIT Press. 1999. Pp. x, 406. $55. 
THE NATURAL GAS MARKET: SIXTY YEARS OF REGULATION AND 
DEREGULATION. By Paul W. MacAvoy. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 2000. Pp. xv, 140. $35. 
Over the last thirty years, regulators have deregulated just about 
every regulated industry. In no industry has deregulation raised as 
much fear and concern as in electric power markets. Even before the 
Enron debacle, a crisis that is more about the failures of corporate 
than regulatory law,1 it was clear that something had gone seriously 
wrong in the turn towards deregulation of electric power. 
Recent events in California are illustrative. In early 2000, consum­
ers in California, the first state to deregulate retail power markets on a 
mass scale, saw repeated months of power interruptions. Many utility 
customers experienced a risk of service shut off - some even had 
their service interrupted - forcing changes in daily routines to find 
access to electric power.2 Hospitals, nursing homes, and municipal 
utilities controlling sewage and water treatment facilities were forced 
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. B.S. 1988, Arizona State; 
J.D. 1991, Iowa; LL.M. 1994, Yale. - Ed. 
1. See infra note 40. 
2. Adam Bryant, Lights Out, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 2001, at 44 (portraying public school 
district students huddled in dark, unheated classrooms as a result of electric power interrup­
tions); Renee Sanchez, California's Image Dims as Lights Go Out, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 
2001, at Al (presenting image of professors handing out flashlights in college classrooms). 
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to make choices affecting human safety when confronted with the 
prospect of power interruption.3 Small businesses, families, and large 
corporations incurred large costs.4 The consequences of California's 
regulatory system were not limited to utility consumers. One of the 
state's largest utilities, Pacific Gas & Electric ("PG&E"), declared 
bankruptcy on April 6, 2001, in part the result of the skyrocketing 
power procurement costs it has incurred in the deregulatory environ­
ment. Its reorganization is now before a federal bankruptcy court.5 
Newspaper, television, and radio headlines overwhelmingly attrib­
uted the California power crisis to deregulation, or economic restruc­
turing, of power markets to favor competitive markets over govern­
ment regulation as a means for allocating power supply. Against the 
backdrop of such events, calls for a return to old-style regulation have 
abounded, often attributing the root cause of California's energy woes 
to deregulation itself.6 Even regulators who are not inclined com­
pletely to abandon deregulation continue to struggle with refining the 
basic path of deregulatory policies, advocating deregulatory models 
that incorporate state participation in power procurement, price caps, 
or other regulatory safeguards in designing power markets. 
The serious book on electric deregulation's failures has yet to be 
written - indeed, it will be several years before a comprehensive 
scholarly account is available - but this Essay uses three recent books 
on the history of regulated industries to address what went wrong in 
the turn toward deregulation of electric power.7 The history of utility 
3. See Sanchez, supra note 2 (noting potential impact on hospitals); Joanne Wojcik, 
Planning, Rapid Response Key to Keeping the Lights On, Bus. INS., Apr. 30, 2001, at 97 (pre­
senting problem hospitals face in planning for unreliable power). 
4. See Bryant, supra note 2 (describing how businesses were affected by power interrup­
tions); Laura M. Rolson, California Power Crisis Hurts Business and Idles Workers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2001, at Al (noting impact of power interruptions on California's economy); 
Sanchez, supra note 2 (mentioning that dairy farmers in California were unable to process 
milk). 
5. In re Pac. Gas & Elec., 263 B.R. 306 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001); Tim Reiterman et al., 
PG&E Declares Bankruptcy; State's Crisis Plans Collapse, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2001, at Al. 
6. In California, for example, Governor Gray Davis presented a plan designed to stabi­
lize power supply and rates, including state negotiation of power supply contracts and state 
purchase of power. See Energy Landscape is Forever Altered, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2001, at 
Al. California is not the only state in which deregulation policies are being abandoned. See 
Jeremy D. Oller & Donald A. Murry, Cascading Caution: Cascading Crisis Delays Deregula­
tion, PUB. UTJL. FORT., Sept. 1, 2001, at 52. 
7. Although no books have yet been published on the topic, a number of fine papers and 
reports discuss what went wrong in California. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein, The Trouble 
with Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster, 16 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 191 (Winter 2002); ERIC HIRST, THE CALIFORNIA ELECTRICITY CRISIS: LESSONS 
FOR OTHER STATES (Edison Elec. Inst. 2001), available at http://www.eei.org/ 
issues/comp_reg/CALessons_hirst.pdf; PAUL L. JOSKOW, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY 
CRISIS (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8442, 2001), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8442; FED. TRADE COMM'N, STAFF REPORT: COMPETITION 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION PERSP. ON ELEC. POWER REG. REFORM: Focus ON RETAIL 
COMPETITION (2001). 
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regulation, addressed in recent books, is a useful place to begin in as­
sessing the problems regulators face today. If that history teaches us 
anything, it is that firm organization in capital-intensive industries is 
cyclical and evolutionary, and often influenced as much by technologi­
cal change as by greed or politics. 
The history of regulation also teaches us that regulatory policy -
including deregulation - is not made in a jurisdictional vacuum. A 
statutory framework defined in Part II of the Federal Power Act, a 
New Deal-era statute enacted by Congress in 1935, gives federal 
regulators extensive powers but also places authority over many elec­
tric power policies in the hands of the states.8 To the extent that state, 
rather than federal, policymakers are fashioning policies, different ju­
risdictional fora will produce many of the regulatory frameworks for 
electric power. If extreme or parochial factions, as may be more likely 
in state as opposed to national politics, successfully capture front-end 
market design of power markets, state politics is more likely to lead to 
dysfunctional markets than national approaches to restructuring. 
I shall argue that, although wrong-headed deregulation policies 
contributed to California's crisis, the California deregulation fiasco il­
lustrates the significance of the political process that produces the sub­
stance of economic regulation. Because it defines the jurisdictional 
scope for this process, the legal resolution of jurisdictional boundaries 
plays a significant role in the development of sound deregulatory poli­
cies. The law of regulatory federalism - defined broadly to include 
federal preemption doctrine, the dormant commerce clause, and state 
action immunity to antitrust enforcement - should find ways to en­
courage desirable participation and discourage undesirable interest 
group capture of the state political process. Regulatory federalism 
doctrines, central to current disputes involving electric power before 
the federal courts, are largely downplayed in the literature on the his­
tory of monopoly and regulation, including the three books reviewed 
in this Essay. The recent disputes in electric regulation challenge fu­
ture authors to write the long overdue chapter on how jurisdictional 
boundaries have adversely affected economic regulation of the electric 
power sector, as well as other regulated industries. 
I. THE HISTORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY IN THE ELECTRIC 
UTILITY CONTEXT 
Monopolies in America: Empire Builders and Their Enemies from 
Jay Gould to Bill Gates is another tour de force by Charles R. Geisst.9 
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824(m) (1994). 
9. Geisst, a finance professor at Manhattan College, is also author of WALL STREET: A 
HISTORY (1997). He has written a dozen books on the history of capitalism, making him one 
of the leading popular audience authorities on the topic. 
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Geisst begins his account with reference to the motto of the popular 
board game Monopoly1° - "Accumulate as much property as possible 
and win" (p. 1) - which he sees as strikingly consistent with the prin­
ciples of monopolistic industries. Geisst admirably traces the evolution 
of monopolies and their control in the U.S., focusing on legal and po­
litical efforts to effectuate control over the monopolistic tendencies he 
sees as inherent in capitalist economies. A colorful illustration of some 
of the most influential industrial and financial titans in U.S. history -
Cornelius "Commodore" Vanderbilt, Jay Gould, J.P. Morgan, John D. 
Rockefeller - as well as the effort of courts and legislators to curb 
their power, Geisst's account spans more than a century, but it does 
not delve in depth into any period or specific legal doctrine. Much, if 
not most, of his effort focuses on antitrust enforcement. 
Throughout the book, however, he also touches on regulated utili­
ties, monopolies that are not targeted by antitrust enforcers but are in­
stead granted and protected by law. His illustrations include tradi­
tional public utility industries, such as railroads, telecommunications, 
and the electric power industry. Geisst briefly explains, for example, 
that for most of the twentieth century, and to a degree even today, 
electric power was provided by the investor-owned "public utility." 
Under this firm structure, which was reinforced by regulatory law, 
high degrees of vertical and horizontal integration were the norm. A 
private company offered consumers a bundle of services, including 
generation, distribution, and transmission, typically while operating as 
a monopolist serving a geographic service territory subject to heavy 
regulation by federal and state agencies. For most of the twentieth 
century, this regulatory regime was stable for both the investor and 
the consumer. Utility stocks were notoriously low-risk, reliable in­
vestments, thus explaining the cheapness of the public utility square 
on the Monopoly board. With few exceptions, electric utilities were 
well suited to providing consumers with reliable, dependable electrical 
service.11 
Geisst weaves a fascinating story, describing through anecdotes the 
historical development of government regulation of monopolies such 
as electric power. His history is robust in scope, touching on dozens of 
industries, including not just traditional public utilities but also book 
publishing, computer, and food manufacturing industries. His general 
thesis is that "[m]onopoly is the logical outcome of free market eco­
nomic organization" (p. 319). More specifically, he sees regulation as 
"the antidote if that power overextends itself and ceases to provide 
benefits" (p. 319). Since Geisst understands regulation as largely 
10. Hasbro, Inc., produces and holds registered trademarks to "Monopoly." 
11. See Jim Rossi, The Common Law "Duty to Serve" and Protection of Consumers in 
an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 V AND. L. REV. 1233 (1998) 
(discussing this history). 
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serving political goals, he is able to weave an intriguing story through 
many colorful historical and political anecdotes. His book provides an 
easily accessible and nicely pitched popular history or introduction for 
a lay audience. 
The book charitably introduces monopoly's early critics. Geisst 
summarizes many of the arguments made by Charles Francis Adams, 
Jr., who wrote a series of essays illustrating the financial problems that 
monopolies, especially the railroads, posed during the Guilded Age 
(pp. 18-23). The origins of regulation, on Geisst's account, were pre­
dominantly ideological and political, rather than economic: "From the 
beginning of the battle, economics and ideology would be mixed in an 
acrimonious argument about who knew what was best for the coun­
try" (p. 23). But on Geisst's account, economics took a backseat to 
political ideology. Adams and others who pushed for state regulation12 
were, according to Geisst, reformers driven predominantly by their 
progressive political beliefs.13 
With masterful attention to detail, Geisst provides an account of 
regulatory and antitrust law as mediating between tempered private 
competition, which is permissible, and the accumulation of power by 
industrial firms, which Geisst deems undesirable. In both its early ac­
counts and later descriptions of the development of antitrust law and 
regulation, however, Geisst's book gives little attention to more rigor­
ous methodological accounts of the goals of antitrust or regulatory 
law. Like many other historical accounts, it fails to present a coherent 
economic theory of monopoly or regulation.14 Thus, while Geisst re­
minds us of many colorful anecdotes and examples, his book does not 
provide the background methodological account most students of 
policy or regulatory reformers will demand. For instance, beyond a 
few broad-brush descriptions of "schools" of economic thought, such 
as the Chicago School, Geisst does not take seriously economic meth­
ods as a way for explaining approaches to regulatory enforcement. 
As Geisst explains it, for example, federal regulation of railroads 
and federal remedies for smashing monopolies under the antitrust 
12. Adams lobbied for Massachusetts' creation of a Board of Railroad Commissioners 
in 1869 and became one of its original members. 
13. By contrast, other historical accounts focus on nascent neo-classical economic prin­
ciples reflected in the writings of reformers such as Adams. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991). Geisst is not unaware of these princi­
ples - he acknowledges that Adams' writings, for example, "provided the basis for what 
would become known as the Harvard school of antitrust economics," p. 46, but he probably 
downplays their significance as ideas in history as it was unfolding. 
14. It is on similar grounds, for example, that Herbert Hovenkamp critiques the work of 
other historical accounts of the same period, such as those presented in LEE BENSON, 
MERCHANTS, FARMERS AND RAILROADS: RAILROAD REGULATION AND NEW YORK 
POLITICS, 1850-1887 (1955); GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION, 1877-1916 
(1965); GEORGE H. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS (1971); see also 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 131-36. 
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laws arose in the late nineteenth century because "the tide had shifted 
against the states' attempts to control the railroads as early as 1871" 
(p. 32). Supreme Court cases recognizing limits on state authority15 
thwarted the effectiveness of well-intentioned state regulators, effec­
tuating a "clear acknowledgement that federal law, not just a patch­
work of state law and court rulings, would be necessary to control the 
railroads" (p. 32). Geisst deserves credit for paying attention to regu­
latory federalism early in our history of regulating monopoly, but he is 
less interested in providing a synthetic methodological explanation of 
regulation than in telling the larger story of its politics.16 
By focusing predominantly on politics, not economic method, 
Geisst downplays contemporary and historical evidence suggesting 
how technological change contributes to firm structure and to concen­
tration in public utility industries such as electric power. Instead, 
Geisst places at the fore of his historical account conflicts between 
profits and populist politics. This theme runs throughout the twentieth 
century as Geisst surveys the Wilson era, the establishment the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, passage of the National Industry Recov­
ery Act, the adoption of the Glass-Steagal Act and later developments 
such as Nader's corporate raiders, the breakup of AT&T, and the 
Microsoft antitrust case. Geisst presents convincing evidence of the 
durability of the tension between profits and bigness, on the one hand, 
and the public interest and government regulation, on the other. He 
nicely illustrates how this tension survived a number of historical eras, 
presenting an account that will appeal to a broad popular audience. 
But historical synthesis of such a range of events comes at a price. 
Although it brims with fascinating stories, Geisst's wide-ranging his­
tory provides little, if any, serious method to mediate the conflicts that 
repeatedly play out in the events. The discerning reader is left grasp­
ing for some methodological account of regulation, or some explana­
tion for why regulation exists independent of its politics. Geisst nicely 
positions the origins of railroad regulation in the context of federalism, 
but he does not address the federalism problems with regulation be­
yond the Gilded Age, including the many problems that have thwarted 
regulatory law from promoting its goals throughout the twentieth cen­
tury. 
15. See, e.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886) (holding 
that a state does not have authority to regulate the intrastate portion of an interstate ship­
ment). 
16. Many other well-regarded histories of the period have been described as disap­
pointing in this same respect. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 136 ("Failure to appreciate 
the complexity of Gilded Age regulatory policy in a federalist system has led historians to 
easy oversimplifications about the nature of regulation."). 
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II. THE MOVEMENT TO DEREGULATION AND THE PROBLEMS WITH 
PARTIAL DEREGULATION 
A more complete historical account of regulation sees the devel­
opment of the vertically integrated public utility as closely related to 
technological change, not primarily motivated by investor greed or 
politics. In the late nineteenth century, for example, the electric power 
industry began with high degrees of decentralization. Only with the 
development of the technologies of the central station and alternating 
current did concentration and vertical integration become economi­
cally practical. Concentration provided benefits not only to utility in­
vestors, but also to consumers, to the extent the technology of the cen­
tral station allowed coordination between supply and use in ways that 
enhanced the availability and reliability of power supply and mini­
mized costs. 17 
Academic historian Richard F. Hirsh's Power Loss: The Origins of 
Deregulation and Restructuring in the American Electric Utility System 
gives us an account of the origins of electric power deregulation. 18 
Hirsh sets out to discern the historical origins of deregulation, but be­
gins by addressing the origins of regulation. For him, regulation's ori­
gins can be traced to a "utility consensus" (p. 2) produced by a mana­
gerial elite that exerted power through "the manipulation of 
individuals and state institutions to obtain results that directly profit 
them."19 Without explicitly invoking public choice theory, Hirsh illus­
trates how "shrewd power company executives realized that state 
oversight meant governmental acceptance of their companies as natu­
ral monopolies, which brought with it a host of benefits (p. 23). He 
does not see progressivism as irrelevant to the utility consensus, but he 
sees the utility consensus as drawing heavily on the progressive idea of 
delegation to a body of elites rather than implementing directly pro­
gressive political values (p. 30). With time, progressive objectives 
would become frustrated, as power company executives would "main­
tain . . .  a cozy relationship with regulators" (p. 45) and close the 
power network (p. 51), leading regulators to play a "subordinate role 
to power company managers" (p. 41). 
17. For an excellent discussion of this history, see HAROLD L. PLAIT, THE ELECTRIC 
CITY: ENERGY AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHICAGO AREA, 1880-1930, at 59-92 (1991). 
18. His book is a nice companion - and largely complementary - to the classic modern 
economic assessment in PAUL JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER 
(1983). 
19. P. 2. Hirsh clarifies that his notion of utility consensus is not to be confused with the 
"regulatory contract," which has been used by utility executives to argue that regulation has 
created a set of legally enforceable obligations. P. 4; see also J. GREGORY SIDAK & DAN F. 
SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE 
COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1997). 
May 2002] Electric Deregulation 1775 
Hirsh properly sees the movement toward deregulation as a com­
plex interaction of political, economic, and technological forces. State 
cost-of-service regulation of the public utility worked well so long as it 
resulted in lower-cost electricity for consumers. But by the 1970s, 
state-centered cost-of-service regulation was no longer seen as an ef­
fective way to keep electricity prices uniformly low. Politically, federal 
regulators saw early steps toward deregulation - taken in President 
Carter's 1977 Energy Plan and endorsed by Congress in the Public 
Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA") (pp. 75, 101-05) 
- as a way to avoid the disasters of excess capacity wrought by over­
building large plants, primarily nuclear, in the 1960s and 1970s, along 
with post-1968 inflation and higher prices of oil after the 1973 oil em­
bargo. "After PURPA began to be implemented . . .  it looked as if the 
utility system, like Humpty Dumpty after his fall, would never be the 
same again" (p. 131). Economically, deregulation was - and, to many, 
still is - seen as good industrial growth policy, as the largest benefici­
aries of deregulation have been large industrial companies who, 
against the backdrop of liberalized supply options, were positioned to 
bargain for lower cost energy inputs (p. 248). Since, by the 1990s, retail 
rates varied widely from state to state, states themselves saw deregula­
tion as a way to even out geographic differences in the cost of power.20 
Moreover, technologically, deregulation provided an opportunity 
for more efficient electric supply options to flourish. Hirsh's history 
recognizes the importance of technological change in making possible 
and popularizing deregulation as a regulatory reform approach in the 
utility industry.21 By the late 1970s, technological improvements made 
smaller scale generation projects more feasible, reducing the depend­
ence on long-term capital commitments for purposes of securing fi­
nancing in the industry (pp. 105-08). Since the late 1970s, most 
economists have recognized power generation as a structurally com­
petitive sector of the industry, although power distribution and trans­
mission remain natural monopolies even today in the eyes of most 
economists (pp. 101-17). Transmission line and coordination technol­
ogy, as well as distribution and metering technology, have also ad­
vanced significantly in recent years, providing new alternatives to 
firms who concentrate their efforts in these sectors of the industry 
(pp. 262-63). 
With technological improvements in electric generation and distri­
bution, the gains from treating generation as competitive, whether po­
litical or economic, were far more significant than they might have 
20. In 1991, for example, Californians paid retail rates that were thirty to fifty percent 
above the national average. P. 253. 
21. In fact, an earlier book by Hirsh focuses exclusively on this theme in the history of 
electric power regulation. See RICHARD F. HIRSH, TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSFORMATION 
IN THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY (1989). 
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been in previous eras. Thus, while deregulation of the industry may 
have benefited investors and some large companies, it is overly sim­
plistic to describe the movement, as many might suggest, as predomi­
nantly driven by greed and politics. When technological advances cre­
ated the prospect of efficiency gains, continuing to protect the 
monopoly of older technology imposed significant costs on consumers. 
The old structure to regulating utilities - based on approval of cost­
of-service rates - placed all of the risk of poor investments on the 
ratepayer, not the investor. The prospect of deregulation shifted these 
risks away from the ratepayer and placed them where they belong -
on utility investors. 
Taking the movement to deregulation full circle, Hirsh ties the 
trend toward deregulation to the fate of utility managers. According to 
him, all of these developments - political, economic, technological -
led to a transition, if not dissolution, of the utility consensus 
(pp. 267-69). "[P]ower company executives lost authority because not 
all of them sought to maintain the terms of the original consensus, 
with some openly seeking to dissolve the traditional structure of the 
system" (p. 264). New interest groups - such as independent power 
producers, public power, and conservation-minded interest groups -
displaced utility executives as the predominant or elite groups in state 
and federal regulatory politics (p. 268). 
Both Geisst and Hirsh provide historical accounts, and in doing so 
have something to say about the process of regulation and deregula­
tion. But as historians they do not focus on the substantive goals of 
regulation, or on any method for evaluating its merits. Looking to de­
regulation in electric power's sister industry, natural gas, Paul 
MacAvoy, a highly-regarded academic regulatory economist, makes 
the case for completely deregulating the natural gas industry in The 
Natural Gas Market: Sixty Years of Regulation and Deregulation. 22 
MacA voy convincingly argues that partial deregulation has im­
peded consumers and other interest groups from realizing the full 
gains of natural gas deregulation. Unlike Geisst and Hirsh, who draw 
on historical methodologies to shed light on regulatory law, MacAvoy 
uses an econometric model to assess the effects of deregulation of 
natural gas on various stakeholders, including producers, pipelines, 
and consumers. Prior to natural gas deregulation, the natural gas mar­
ket experienced widespread shortages, followed by a bubble period 
during the 1980s. MacAvoy believes that the industry began improving 
22. MacAvoy is a professor at the Yale School of Management and the author of a 
number of works on natural gas, railroad and telecommunications deregulation. He co­
authored ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION (1974) with Justice 
(then Professor) Stephen Breyer. His other studies of the natural gas industry include PRICE 
FORMATION IN NATURAL GAS FIELDS: A STUDY OF COMPETITION, MONOPSONY AND 
REGULATION (1962); and THE ECONOMICS OF THE NATURAL GAS SHORTAGE, 1960-1980 
(1975) with Robert S. Pindyck. 
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its prior dismal performance once federal deregulation policies were 
implemented. As MacA voy illustrates, the deregulatory policies initi­
ated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") in 
1985 and culminating with Order No. 636 in 1992 have created high 
levels of economic performance in the industry and have led to an in­
creased use of in-ground storage of gas, helping to ensure adequate 
supply (p. 17). 
"Partial deregulation" policies, however, have impeded the degree 
of improvement in the natural gas industry. For example, MacAvoy 
observes that "gas reserves and gas production have not greatly ex­
panded after Order 636" (p. 93). Without a doubt, the Order has con­
tributed to high natural gas prices. According to MacAvoy, the reason 
for this limited growth is that FERC's policies in Order No. 636 con­
strain markets for spot gas and transport capacity.23 As MacAvoy's 
econometric model illustrates, substantial gains could be realized by 
consumers, pipelines, and consumers if FERC further deregulated 
pipeline capacity (p. 98). MacA voy believes that federal regulators 
should remove "tariff rates on released and firm capacity between 
major hubs" and set benchmark tariffs to limit the exercise of market 
power (p. 99). 
Moreover, MacAvoy argues, the gains of deregulation have been 
thwarted by the actions of state regulators. The unbundling of markets 
for retail gas and distribution remains largely in the hands of state 
regulators and subject to state politics. Many states - twenty-three 
plus the District of Columbia at the time of MacAvoy's study (p. 100) 
- have implemented programs that would allow small residential or 
commercial customers to "unbundle" retail service, separating the de­
livery of gas from transportation and storage (p. 105). Unbundling, as 
MacAvoy suggests, holds out the "promise of deregulation" to the ex­
tent that consumers could purchase services from sources that are not 
subject to rate regulation by states (p. 105). 
But as MacAvoy reminds us, there is "no empirical foundation for 
the position that vertical separation of gas ownership, transport and 
billing reduces costs; indeed, there would be an increase in transaction 
costs with more transactions" (p. 105). In fact, MacAvoy suggests, with 
unbundling many state and local regulators have imposed require­
ments for "utility line access, system balancing, and load forecasting" 
(p. 111). To be sure, state regulators liave imposed such requirements 
for the hope of continued reliability and consumer protection in their 
respective jurisdictions. But MacAvoy believes that unbundling to 
23. In Order No. 636, for example, FERC retained price regulation of both firm and re­
lease capacity, which has limited the expansion of pipeline transportation and adversely af­
fected prices and quantities. Pp. 94-95. According to MacAvoy, "[t]hese limits act like rent 
control in a housing market, creating disincentives to provide more capacity, whether by the 
pipeline or by the shipper in release contracts." P. 95. 
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create the benefits of competition has created a political need for fur­
ther intervention in individual transactions by state regulatory agen­
cies, thwarting the gains from natural gas competition (p. 111). In his 
final analysis, MacA voy argues that natural gas markets could realize 
price gains of as much as twenty percent by eliminating federal and 
state regulation of transmission and distributor systems (p. 120). 
Ill. MARKET DESIGN ORT AXA TION AS A MECHANISM FOR 
PROVIDING FOR PUBLIC GOODS? 
Geisst, Hirsh, and MacA voy tell us a great deal about how the 
regulatory process and regulatory law have failed as we embarked 
upon the deregulatory path in California and other states. In the elec­
tric power sector, regulators and legislators have almost exclusively re­
sponded to political signals and short-sighted concerns with profitabil­
ity in formulating state plans for electric power competition. While the 
popular press's anecdotes of deregulatory policies, especially in states 
like California, would nicely complement and continue a history that 
sees such events as the result of progressive politics or regulatory cap­
ture, these anecdotes give short shrift to the technological innovations 
that Hirsh correctly sees as a central motivation of the deregulation 
movement. 
If, as MacAvoy argues, partial deregulation has impeded realiza­
tion of the benefits of gas regulation, it is more likely to thwart the 
gains of competition in electric power. Thus, MacAvoy's study of par­
tial deregulation of natural gas markets provides an important analog 
for understanding many of the specific failures in California and fed­
eral electric power deregulatory policies. For example, federal regula­
tors completely deregulated wholesale electric power supply markets 
when FERC adopted Order No. 888 in 1996. That order implemented 
open access to transmission facilities in wholesale power supply mar­
kets. Against this backdrop, some states, like California, have deregu­
lated markets subject to state control; others, like Florida, have stead­
fastly resisted any movement towards deregulation. 
California's deregulation plan included a price cap on retail power, 
designed to protect retail consumers.24 During the year 2000, however, 
price caps forced the state's utilities between a fiscal rock and a hard 
place when supply shortages sent wholesale prices skyrocketing. At 
the same time, California's utilities were allowed to recover billions of 
dollars in subsidies through stranded cost surcharges and access fees 
- dollars paid to utilities by consumers and competitors that often 
24. See A.B. 1890 § 854, 1996 Cal. Stat. 854, codified in relevant part at CAL. PUB. UTIL. 
CODE§§ 330-398.5 (West Supp. 2001). 
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lined the fisc of the electric utility's parent.25 With deregulation, 
California also failed to reassess its state power plant siting laws for 
the competitive market, creating uncertainty for even those investors 
who wanted to build generation plants to serve California consumers.26 
MacAvoy, however, warns policymakers against glorifying unbun­
dling, or a single preferred firm structure, in a competitive market 
(pp. 105-06). The fetish for unbundling among reformers, while a nice 
counter-juxtaposition to the predominant organizational form, may 
prove dangerous if technological innovations coupled with economic 
incentives swing back toward a need for convergence of services in the 
industry. California regulators, for example, experimented with efforts 
to dictate firm structure in electric power. Their establishment of the 
Power Exchange led to a prohibition against suppliers offering long­
term contracts, a regulation designed to keep suppliers from locking 
into a market and migrating toward a vertically integrated structure.27 
While a well-intentioned effort to bolster a growth in competitive spot 
markets for power supply, this prohibition eviscerated one of the most 
important financing tools for attracting power investors. It also poten­
tially exposed consumers to price volatilities, otherwise softened 
through long-term contracts.28 The prohibition on long-term contracts 
also worked to favor incumbent supply firms, providing them fertile 
opportunities for strategic manipulation of the market.29 
25. See Michael A. Yuffee, California's Electricity Crisis: How Best to Respond to the 
"Perfect Storm," 22 ENERGY L.J. 65, 71 (2001); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, 
Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV. 1435 (2000) (criticizing stranded cost 
recovery); Jim Rossi, The Irony of Deregulatory Takings, 77 TEXAS L. REV. 297 (1998) 
(same). 
26. See Yuffee, supra note 25, at 68 (describing state's "extremely complex "  generation 
siting and permitting procedures). 
27. California's restructuring policies included a buy-sell requirement, prohibiting utili­
ties from acquiring power through forward-looking contracting, which was to remain effec­
tive until all utilities recovered their stranded costs. Pursuant to this requirement, all inves­
tor-owned utilities were required to bid all of their generation into a power exchange and 
were required to purchase all of their power from the power exchange. See Preferred Policies 
Governing Restructuring California's Electric Service Industry and Reforming Regulation, 
166 Pub. Util. Reg. 24 (Dec. 20, 1995). The requirement and its rationales are discussed in 
Yuffee, supra note 25, at 69. 
28. California Power Exch. Corp. v. FERC, 245 F.3d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2001). 
29. See Yuffee, supra note 25, at 70-71; see also California Power Exchange, 245 F.3d at 
1116 (noting that FERC determined that over-reliance "on the spot market also exposed 
the . . .  [utilities] to the possible exercise of market power " by wholesale suppliers). As a 
remedy, FERC eliminated the power exchange buy/sell requirement, inviting the use of for­
ward-looking contracting. Id. FERC observed that "eliminating any mandated reliance on 
the spot market represents the single most important aspect of wholesale market reform and 
is one of the most critical components of all of the immediate market reforms necessary to 
correct the problems in California electric markets and provide long-term protection of cus­
tomers." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The remedy, however, did not provide California 
utilities the relief they needed against the backdrop of the retail price cap. 
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As these examples illustrate, the problem in California was not 
necessarily deregulation. Instead, the problem was the way in which 
state regulators designed deregulated power markets to provide for 
public goods, such as consumer and environmental protection, par­
ticularly against the background of federal regulatory policies encour­
aging competition in the same industry. Misguided regulatory backlash 
in reaction to failed deregulatory policies may produce significant so­
cial costs, eerily echoing the same concerns that gave rise to the de­
mand for deregulation in the first place. Consider, for example, the 
now widely known source of California's power woes: demand for 
power outstripping supply. The obviously simple solution of building 
more plants, especially if subsidized with tax benefits or by consumer 
rates, or if planned by state or federal regulators, places the risk of an­
other overcapacity problem with the public or consumers - not with 
investors, where it belongs. Thus, the obviously simple policy solution 
here leads to costly and absurd results. 
The California deregulation fiasco was created by state regulators' 
misguided efforts to provide for public goods in the face of deregu­
lated energy markets, not necessarily by deregulation itself. The provi­
sion of public goods, such as consumer and environmental protection, 
is an important policy for state regulators. In California, however, the 
mechanisms for public good provision were misplaced and contributed 
to dysfunctional power markets - especially since California policy­
makers failed to anticipate how their new power markets might actu­
ally operate in practice. 
While California regulators attempted to provide for public goods 
in ex ante market design, this approach created at least two problems. 
First, a focus on front-end market design may itself be flawed if looked 
to as the primary mechanism for providing for public goods. Taxation 
mechanisms are the most efficient way to provide for pubic goods, be­
cause they create the fewest price distortions and avoid the strategic 
ma,nipulation opportunities created by planned efforts at market de­
sign. Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, for example, argue 
that the fairness of legal rules is best ensured through back-end taxa­
tion measures rather than in front-end architecture or design.30 Legal 
rules, they observe, are designed to affect only small fractions of the 
population and, at best, accomplish only crude redistribution. As they 
state, "redistribution through legal rules entails both the inefficiency 
of redistribution generally (due to adverse effects on work incentives) 
and the additional cost involved in adopting less efficient legal rules."31 
30. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
961 (2001). 
31. Id. at 994; see also Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Should Legal Rules Favor the 
Poor? Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. 
LEG. STUD. 821 (2000); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Why the Legal System is Less Effi­
cient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 667 (1994). 
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On their analysis, the price distortions and other adverse effects of 
front-end redistributive policies imposed through rules of market de­
sign, including these effects on strategic behavior, can create serious 
inefficiencies. By contrast, the imposition of taxes to support redis­
tributive policies minimizes both price distortions and strategic ma­
nipulation of the market. If Kaplow and Shavell are correct, taxation 
mechanisms are the best way for deregulated electric power markets 
to minimize price distortions while also enhancing social welfare. Fed­
eral regulators have adopted this approach, however imperfectly, in 
the context of telecommunications deregulation, where something 
akin to a tax, rather than a service mandate, finances universal service. 
A second problem with California's approach to electric power de­
regulation was a practical result of the state political process in which 
it was adopted. More than deregulation in the contexts of telecommu­
nications or natural gas deregulation, electric power deregulation is 
the result of state political processes. In California, for instance, the 
deregulation plan adopted in 1996 included many front-end market 
design mechanisms designed to appease consumer groups so that state 
legislators could assure their constituents that deregulation would lead 
to rate reductions. In retrospect, the California Assembly could not 
have been more wrong! California adopted one market model, mixing 
it with incompatible features. According to the distinguished econo­
mist Paul Joskow, "It was an accident waiting to happen from day 
one."32 
Even where front-end market design might work, the political pa­
thologies of the state political process are certain to make its success 
even less likely. At best, it will probably result in "partial deregula­
tion," akin to the phenomenon critiqued by MacAvoy, by retaining 
patchwork regulation but for the wrong reasons and in the wrong 
form. 
IV. REGULATORY FEDERALISM AND EFFICIENT ELECTRIC POWER 
(DE-)REGULATION 
Ultimately, a major source of the problem with deregulation of 
electric power can be traced to the eighteenth-century origins of fed­
eral railroad regulation discussed in Geisst's book. As with railroad 
regulation, a jurisdictional divide in electric power regulation between 
federal and state regulators threatens the ability of even well­
intentioned state regulators to implement efficient regulatory policies 
in the electric industry. This divide has been a longstanding issue of 
contention in electric power regulation. For instance, when Rhode 
Island attempted to regulate the rates charged by a Rhode Island plant 
32. Arthur O'Donnell, Economists and the Golden State, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 1, 
2002, at 20. 
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selling electricity to a Massachusetts company, which then resold elec­
tricity to the city of Attleboro, Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court 
invalidated the regulation because it imposed a "direct burden upon 
interstate commerce. "33 This limitation on state regulation, which cre­
ated the "Attleboro gap" (an area in which neither federal nor state 
regulators had jurisdiction), led Congress to adopt Part II of the Fed­
eral Power Act in 1935, giving federal authorities jurisdiction over 
interstate electricity transactions that are beyond the scope of state 
authority. 
But leaving even residual authority over regulation to the states 
raises difficulties for regulatory law. The strongest interest groups may 
more readily capture the regulatory process in state politics than in na­
tional politics, thereby thwarting the goals of both federal and state 
regulatory policies. To the extent that state politics enhances the par­
ticipation of stakeholders in the regulatory process - and the lower 
costs of participation in state and local politics holds particular prom­
ise in this regard - the state forum has many advantages over federal 
regulation for the development of economic regulatory policies. State 
governments, for example, are routinely touted as laboratories of de­
mocracy, encouraging policy experimentation that the federal gov­
ernment would find unwieldy because of the heterogeneity of interest 
groups at the federal level and the costs associated with national im­
plementation of policies. 
At the same time, however, states allow more extreme interest 
groups to influence the content of policies, since those interest groups 
are not required to build coalitions with others in the more diverse na­
tional forum, where extreme factions are less likely to influence policy. 
For reasons Madison articulated in The Federalist No. 10 - well­
chronicled in modern public choice literature - constituent groups, 
including industrial consumers, environmental groups, and consumer 
interests, are more likely to organize into dysfunctional factions at the 
state level, as opposed to in national politics.34 Such factions can ad­
versely influence the content of economic regulation. Moreover, the 
state political process is more prone to favor interest groups with pa­
rochial concerns, rather than those that are likely to favor concerns af­
fecting matters outside of a given state. As Hirsh's study of deregula­
tion indicates, in electric power restructuring many of the interest 
groups favoring competitive markets are out-of-state stakeholders, 
prone to clash with the interests of in-state rivals who have held mo­
nopolies for more than a half century.35 
33. See Pub. Util. Comm'n of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273 U.S. 
83, 89 (1927). 
34. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison). 
35. For one commentator's view of how state and local political processes may not be as 
effective as federal processes in reflecting the values of constituents, see Clayton P. Gillette, 
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Against the backdrop of the state political process and its produc­
tion of laws and policies conflicting with federally created wholesale 
power markets, regulatory federalism issues define a number of legal 
disputes facing the industry today. For example, a recent U.S. 
Supreme Court case addresses the jurisdictional issues in FERC's 1996 
restructuring order, known as Order No. 888. In Order No. 888, FERC 
took a major step toward implementing wholesale power competition 
by requiring utilities subject to its jurisdiction to adopt a standard tar­
iff offering transmission service to customers other than retail custom­
ers on a nondiscriminatory basis. FERC's order asserted preemptive 
authority to prescribe such requirements notwithstanding the exis­
tence of state rules to the contrary. FERC, however, declined to assert 
jurisdiction over the transmission component embedded in traditional 
retail sales service to native load customers. On appeal, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit affirmed the open access requirements 
as well as the jurisdictional rulings FERC made in Order No. 888.36 
The Court affirmed that FERC's jurisdiction extended to transmission 
even where the generating plant and consumer were located in the 
same state.37 While FERC's Order No. 888 did not require all jurisdic­
tional utilities to unbundle the transmission component of service 
from retail sale services, the D.C. Circuit concluded that FERC's more 
restrictive reading of the statute, which deferred to state jurisdiction 
over bundled service, was permissible and subject to deference by the 
court.38 
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court granted two petitions for certio­
rari to review the D.C. Circuit's jurisdictional rulings.39 State regula­
tory officials brought the first appeal, which maintained that FERC's 
assertion of authority over intrastate transmission reached too far by 
including unbundled retail transmissions of electricity widening the 
scope of its open access requirements. The other appeal, brought by 
Enron,40 the now infamous power marketer, maintained that FERC's 
Comment, Interest Groups in the 21st Century City, 32 URB. LAW. 423 (2000); see also Clay­
ton P. Gillette, Jn Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local 
Government Law, 67 CHI. KENT L. REV. 959 (1991). 
36. See Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
37. Id. at 693-95. 
38. Id. at 694-95. 
39. See New York v. FERC, 69 U.S.L.W. 3574 (Feb. 26, 2001) (Nos. 00-568 and 00-809). 
40. Of course, by Spring 2002, Enron had announced the largest bankruptcy in United 
States history. Enron's collapse and the subsequent scandal over Enron's corporate financial 
reporting seem to be driven primarily by internal management decisions, not the external 
deregulatory policies under which Enron often operated. To the extent regulatory policies 
played a direct role in Enron's financial failure, these were corporate disclosure policies, not 
policies related to competition in electric power. However, failure of regulators to effectively 
monitor power marketers' claims of supply and demand did allow Enron and others to ma­
nipulate markets for financial gain. See Richard Behr, Papers Show that Enron Manipulated 
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assertion of jurisdiction did not go far enough and that FERC is re­
quired to extend its open access remedy to bundled retail transmis­
sions. 
The Supreme Court consolidated the two appeals and issued a sin­
gle opinion upholding the D.C. Circuit's approval of FERC's Order 
No. 888 - the most significant opinion in decades to define the scope 
of federal power to implement competition in electric power mar­
kets.4 1 The Court observed that the Federal Power Act did not, in its 
express language, evidence a congressional intent to safeguard preex­
isting state regulation of the delivery of electricity to retail customers,42 
and that FERC was careful not to attempt to exercise control over lo­
cal distribution facilities.43 Thus, the Court concluded, the Federal 
Power Act "unquestionably supports" FERC's assertion of jurisdic­
tion "to regulate the unbundled transmissions of electricity retailers."44 
Effectively, the Court held that the Federal Power Act was not limited 
in its jurisdiction to closing the "Attleboro gap," but also extend fed­
eral jurisdiction to the regulation of wholesale sales that had previ­
ously been subject to state jurisdiction. 
As if this holding was not enough to empower federal regulators, 
the Enron argument invited the Court to further clarify the expansive 
scope of federal power over competition in electric power. In rejecting 
Enron's argument that FERC had held itself powerless to assert juris­
diction to remedy undue discrimination in bundled retail transmissions 
of electricity, the Court made it very clear that FERC had this author­
ity.45 Although FERC did not error in failing to exercise it in Order 
No. 888, which concerned discrimination in the wholesale market, the 
Court observed that if "FERC were to investigate this alleged [retail] 
discrimination and make findings concerning undue discrimination in 
the retail electricity market," the Federal Power Act "would require 
FERC to provide a remedy for that discrimination. "46 
California Crisis, WASH. POST, May 7, 2002, at Al; Kathryn Kranhold and Rebecca Sedth, 
Two Other Firms in Enron Scheme, WALL ST. J., May 9, 2002, at Al; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., 
How Enron Got California to Buy Power It Didn't Need, N. Y. TIMES, May 8, 2002, at Cl. 
41. New York v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 122 S. Ct. 1012 (2002). 
42. Id. at 1024. The language of the Federal Power Act gives FERC jurisdiction over 
the "transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and . .. the sale of such energy 
at wholesale in interstate commerce." 16 U.S.C. § 824(b). According to the Court, this lan­
guage limits FERC's jurisdiction over the sale of power to the wholesale market, but 
authorizes FERC's jurisdiction over transmission, without regard to whether transmissions 
are sold to a reseller or directly to a retail customer. New York v. FERC, 122 S. Ct. at 1024. 
43. Id. at 1026. This was important because 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) precludes FERC from 
asserting jurisdiction "over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over facili­
ties used in local distribution . ... " 
44. New York v. FERC, 122 S. Ct. at 1026. 
45. Id. at 1028. 
46. Id. 
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Even where federal policymakers have not expressly asserted ju­
risdiction, legal doctrines play an important role in minimizing market 
distortions created by the state regulatory process. Because interest 
groups are more readily able to capture the state regulatory process, 
as well as states' deregulation policies, state laws could potentially 
thwart full evolution of markets in electric power. If markets in elec­
tric power are to flourish, courts will be asked to clarify the role of ad­
ditional doctrines, such as federal preemption doctrine, the dormant 
commerce clause, and state action doctrine in limiting state regulators. 
In fashioning limits on state regulatory power, courts must balance the 
advantages of state power, including its promotion of experimentation 
and the lower cost political participation it offers home-turf 
stakeholders, with its costs, many of which are related to the nonde­
mocratic implications of adverse interest group behavior in the regula­
tory process. 
Approaches of regulators in California and Florida, for example, 
illustrate how, in the state regulatory process, front-end market design 
can serve as a forum for interest group capture of the regulatory proc­
ess. In California, regulators protected in-state consumers by coupling 
the state's deregulation plan with retail price caps, even though whole­
sale power markets were not subject to price caps. When wholesale 
power prices increased by more than 500% in the second half of 1999 
and the second half of 2000, retail prices were fixed, limiting the reve­
nue recovery for California utilities and forcing them into insolvency.47 
In Florida, the state supreme court has interpreted a state power plant 
siting statute to limit plant siting to only those suppliers who are 
Florida utilities or who have contracts with Florida residents.48 The re­
sult is to close Florida's wholesale power market to merchant power 
plants, plants intended to compete in federally deregulated wholesale 
power markets. For two consecutive terms, Florida's Legislature has 
failed to amend its statute to override the supreme court interpreta­
tion, ignoring the interpretation of the state regulatory agency charged 
with enforcing it and an independent commission's recommenda­
tions.49 Taking their cue from Florida's success in blocking the devel­
opment of wholesale power supply, other state and local governments, 
particularly in the South, have imposed moratoria on merchant power 
plants.50 
47. See JOSKOW, supra note 7, at 1. 
48. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 435 (Fla. 2000) (holding that state's 
power plant siting statute "was not intended to authorize the determination of need for a 
proposed power plant output that is not fully committed to use by Florida customers who 
purchase electrical power at retail rates "). 
49. See Steve Huettel, Panel Okays Energy Plan, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 16, 
2001, at lE. 
50. See Chris Deisinger, The Backlash Against Merchant Plants and the Need for a New 
Regulatory Model, 13 ELECTRICITY J. 51 (Dec. 2000); Nervous of NOx, Southern Govs. Put 
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If invoked by courts with the idea of limiting states' ability to 
thwart the goals of federal policies, doctrines such as federal preemp­
tion and the dormant commerce clause hold promise to limit, or at 
least temper, the use of state political processes to thwart operation of 
competitive markets in electric power. For instance, pursuant to fed­
eral law, state regulatory commissions are required to allow the retail 
utilities to recover the costs of FERC-mandated wholesale transac­
tions and cannot disallow, or "trap," these costs by refusing to allow 
the utility to recover them in retail rates, unless they are imprudently 
incurred.51 According to one set of authors, "the case law points 
strongly to the conclusion that California acted in violation of the Su­
premacy Clause when it refused to allow Edison and PG&E to pass 
through in retail rates the costs the two utilities incurred in purchasing 
wholesale power from the California Power Exchange."52 Although 
federal law does not have a definitive preemptive effect on rate caps, 
California's policies raise the prospect for such challenges.53 Similarly, 
Florida's restriction on siting out-of-state merchant plants raised fed­
eral preemption issues against the backdrop of FERC's Order No. 
888, which adopted a federal policy of competition in wholesale 
power. Although FERC's rule did not preempt state regulators' 
authority to regulate the legitimate environmental impacts of power 
plant siting, FERC expressed a clear preference for relying on the 
market, not state regulators, to determine the need for wholesale 
power supply. 
In addition to the argument that FERC's policies potentially pre­
empted Florida's need restrictions on siting power plants, Florida's re­
strictive siting statute raises the potential for dormant commerce 
clause challenges to state regulations that impair competition, or 
impermissibly discriminate against out-of-state commerce by favoring 
in-state over out-of-state suppliers. Such arguments were raised before 
Plants on Hold, ELECTRICITY DAILY, Aug. 28, 2001; State Limits on Merchant Plants a 
Growing Worry, GENERATION WK., Aug. 22, 2001 . 
51.  This is the federal preemptive effect of the "filed rate " doctrine. See generally Mis­
sissippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988); Nantahala 
Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953 (1986). In the natural gas context, the Su­
preme Court held that Congress's decision to substitute market-based prices for cost-of­
service regulation does not alter the preemptive effect of the filed rate doctrine on the states. 
See Transcon. Gas Pipeline Corp. v. State Oil & Gas Bd. of Miss., 474 U.S. 409, 417-23 
(1986). A limited exception to the doctrine, known as the Pike County exception, is recog­
nized where a state commission declares a particular quantity of power unreasonably exces­
sive and lower-cost power is available elsewhere. Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 972. California's 
utilities, however, were barred from purchasing power outside of the state's Power Ex­
change. 
52. Nicholas W. Fels & Frank R. Lindh, Lessons from the California "Apocalypse:" Ju­
risdiction Over Electric Utilities, 22 ENERGY L.J. 1, 19 (2001). 
53. Oddly, and to no avail, California regulators tried to turn the argument around, su­
ing FERC for its failure to cap wholesale rates. The State Legislators Set to Sue Federal En­
ergy Agency Power, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at BS. 
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and rejected by the Florida Supreme Court,54 but the inadequacy of a 
record establishing discrimination against out-of-state suppliers may 
impede their acceptance by the court. As other states impose morato­
ria on out-of-state merchant power plants that do not apply to in-state 
utilities, we can expect constitutional challenges to the state protec­
tionist policies to mount. Such constitutional challenges have already 
been posed to state environmental regulations, many of which poten­
tially favor in-state suppliers.55 
A final, and increasingly important, regulatory federalism doctrine 
that will increasingly affect competition in electric power is state ac­
tion immunity from federal antitrust enforcement. Unlike federal pre­
emption and dormant commerce clause doctrines, which limit public 
actors, state action immunity relates to limits on the exercise of private 
decisionmakers in violation of antitrust laws. In Parker v. Brown, the 
U.S. Supreme Court enunciated the rule that principles of federalism 
immunize anticompetitive conduct pursuant to state laws restricting 
competition from federal antitrust scrutiny because "[i]n a dual system 
of government . . .  an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control 
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to 
Congress."56 Even before deregulation, state action immunity did not 
insulate utilities from all antitrust suits.57 With federal deregulation 
and uneven and partial state deregulation, the extent to which state 
action immunity will immunize anticompetitive conduct from the 
reach of federal antitrust law in a deregulated electric power market 
remains unclear, particularly given the traditional extent to which 
states have regulated electric utilities. 
Early cases have affirmed, based on analysis of state regulations, 
that a state regulatory policy prohibiting retail competition insulates a 
state's utilities from antitrust suits by competing suppliers seeking ac­
cess to retail transmission.58 But, with evolving state regulatory poli-
54. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Garcia, 767 So. 2d 428, 436 (Fla. 2000). 
55. See Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based 
Regulation: The Case of Electricity Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243 (1999); Steven 
Ferrey, Renewable Subsidies in the Age of Deregulation: State-Imposed Preferences May 
Have Come to the Wrong Place at the Wrong Time, FORTNIGHTLY., Dec. 1997. 
56. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). State action immunity has developed into a two-part test, 
today known as the "Midcal test." "First, the challenged restraint must be one 'clearly ar­
ticulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'; [and] second, the policy must be 'ac­
tively supervised' by the State itself." California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Alu-
minum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980). 
· 
57. See, e.g., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 596 n.35 (1976) (finding utility 
liable for illegal tying in connection with its program for distributing free light bulbs to resi­
dential customers, even though the light bulb exchange program was part of the utility's ap­
proved tariff); Gainesville Util. Dep't v. Florida Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 
1978) (competing electric power companies conspired to divide the Florida wholesale power 
market in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act). 
58. See North Star Steel v. Mid-Am. Energy, 184 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that 
electric utility is protected by state action immunity from customer's antitrust suit based on 
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cies, along with changes in both the industry and federal competition 
policy, the regulatory basis for state action immunity is shifting and in 
need of careful analysis. The federal government has declared a policy 
of wholesale competition in power supply and, even following the 
California fiasco, many states continue to express policies favoring re­
tail competition. It is incumbent on federal courts to interpret the 
scope and degree of continued regulation posed by state policies, but 
state action immunity does not stand for automatic deference to the 
states. As an illustration, consider the conflict between the U.S. Courts 
of Appeals for the Tenth and Ninth Circuits. Notwithstanding claims 
of dysfunctional interest group involvement in a state regulatory 
scheme, evidence that is not directly relevant to the state action im­
munity legal inquiry, the Tenth Circuit held that state action immunity 
extends in a blanket manner to all utility sales regulated by the 
Oklahoma Corporate Commission, precluding an antitrust suit by a 
competitor who lost customers to a regulated utility.59 By contrast, the 
Ninth Circuit held that an electrical cooperative's suit alleging that a 
utility violated antitrust laws by refusing to allow the cooperative to 
"wheel" (or provide access to its transmission facilities) to supply 
power to the utility's customers was not subject to state action immu­
nity in Idaho.(J() 
The primary purpose of the state action doctrine is to respect fed­
eralism concerns. But in a deregulatory era, courts should be wary of 
blanket deference to state regulatory programs and instead should 
look carefully to the scope and extent of specific regulatory provisions. 
Although evidence of adverse interest group behavior in states is not 
directly relevant to doctrinal application of the state action doctrine, 
the potential of such behavior behooves careful judicial construction 
of the specific scope and extent of state regulation in deciding to sus­
pend application of antitrust law to private behaviors.61 
refusal to allow customer access over transmission lines to alternate sources of electricity, 
given Iowa's establishment of exclusive service territories for electric generation); TEC 
Cogeneration v. Florida Power & Light Co., 184 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 1996) (applying state 
action immunity to a utility's refusal to wheel power for cogenerators in its service territory, 
given Florida's specific regulatory prohibition on such wheeling). 
59. Trigen-Okla. City Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec., 244 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 
2001) (holding that all of Oklahoma Gas & Electric's sales of electricity are regulated by the 
state, and thus lawsuit by competitor who lost a customer to utility was subject to state ac­
tion immunity). 
60. Snake River Valley Elec. Ass'n v. PacifiCorp, 238 F.3d 1 189 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding 
no active supervision of private agreements to divide customers, so state action immunity 
does not apply). Another case refusing to extend state action to a dispute in emerging com­
petition power markets is United States v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 172, 
176 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that contract provisions, required by the utility, that prohib­
ited a customer from entering the electricity market as a competitor in the future in ex­
change for a discounted electric rate, were not protected by the state action doctrine). 
61. John Wiley has argued that courts should pay attention to interest group behavior in 
resolving the application of state action immunity. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture 
May 2002] Electric Deregulation 1789 
Together, these regulatory federalism doctrines will help deter­
mine the success of competition in electric power. The legal doctrines 
have distinct purposes and are invoked in distinct regulatory conflicts, 
but in the context of each of these doctrines courts must recognize that 
federal competition policy, even if limited to wholesale supply mar­
kets, cannot peacefully coexist with balkanized, protectionist regula­
tion by individual states. Courts have developed longstanding doc­
trines of regulatory law to guard against such conflicts. The potential 
for interest group regulation gives rise to a need for narrow construc­
tion of state authority, along with an expectation of clear articulation 
of policies prohibiting competition by state regulators, in such con­
texts. Federal courts might inform application of regulatory federalism 
doctrines with awareness of the most egregious instances of interest 
group capture of the state regulatory process. While this alone would 
not guarantee the success of state regulation in the deregulatory envi­
ronment - state politicians also must make the right choices about 
substantive regulation - regulatory federalism holds promise for 
promoting more successful state regulation in implementing competi­
tion policy. 
CONCLUSION 
New regulation of the electric power industry and the operation of 
its workers will be necessary, but regulators would be wise to ac­
knowledge that a return to partial or full re-regulation of the industry 
is unlikely to create more efficient markets in states like California. 
Moreover, regulatory backlash in reaction to failed deregulatory poli­
cies may risk recreating some of the very same problems that gave rise 
to regulatory reform, coopted by deregulation advocates over the last 
thirty years.62 The exercise of sound policy judgment is contingent on 
the political process and the incentives it creates for both participants 
and decisionmakers. Without the appropriate incentives, the state and 
local political process for formulating economic regulations can easily 
respond to the wrong signals. To be sure, as MacA voy suggests, even 
federal regulators sometimes make the wrong decisions. But because 
Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 743 (1986). For criticism of this cap­
ture theory approach, see Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Effi­
ciency and the Political Process, 96 YALE L.J. 486, 508-18 (1987). A more workable ap­
proach, using a political process argument to incorporate dormant commerce clause analysis 
into state action immunity doctrine, is presented in Daniel J. Gifford, Federalism, Efficiency, 
the Commerce Clause, and the Sherman Act: Why We Should Follow Consistent Free Market 
Policy, 44 EMORY L.J. 1227, 1276 (1995) (arguing "not only do the political processes as 
presently established fail to protect consumers from municipally established monopolies, but 
these political processes also foster the creation of monopolies as ways of obscuring from the 
voting public the extent to which society's assets are being misallocated"). 
62. For criticism of California's re-regulation response, see How to Keep the Fans 
Turning, ECONOMIST, July 21, 2001, at 26. 
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so many of the details of electric power market operations remain in 
state regulators' hands, the propensity for poor decisions is subject to 
a different sort of interest group pressure and varied geographic solu­
tions, especially given the emerging new interest groups Hirsh identi­
fies, many of which are national rather than parochial in scope. 
In light of recent events in the electric power industry, courts have 
the opportunity to curb state power to respond to extreme interest 
group politics. These recent events, particularly those in California, 
will challenge future accounts of regulation and deregulation to strug­
gle further with the theme of jurisdictional boundaries and, specifi­
cally, how these boundaries influence interest group behavior in the 
formulation of regulatory law. Regulatory law will remain important, 
as deregulation of one aspect of this industry gives rise to a need to 
regulate elsewhere, but jurisdictional clarity can only help policy­
makers in discerning where that need is legitimate and where it is not. 
